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LIMITING THE PRESIDENCY TO NATURAL
BORN CITIZENS VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
PAUL A. CLARK"

INTRODUCTION

Article II of the United States Constitution declares that the
President of the United States must be a "natural born citizen."'
In recent years, the number of legal scholars attacking this
provision has been growing, and there have been numerous calls
for a constitutional amendment to repeal this provision. Oddly, no
one has argued that this provision can be thrown out by judges;
however, it seems clear that this provision is in complete
contradiction to the current understanding of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Numerous Supreme Court
precedents have said that classifications based on national origin
are subject to strict scrutiny and
are presumptively
unconstitutional for the federal government or the states.
Moreover, there is ample precedent for the view that a
constitutional amendment can overrule an earlier part of the
constitution by implication, as well as by explicit repeal. Hence,
there is nothing radically new in the idea that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment can be held to overrule the
"Natural Born Citizen" Clause of Article II.
I.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND
REPEAL OF EARLIER PROVISIONS

It is a basic rule of legal interpretation that statutes should
not be read to render one provision of a code voided by another
unless there is a clear contradiction between the two provisions:
[I]t is among the elementary principles with regard to the
construction of statutes, that every section, provision, and clause of
a statute shall be expounded by a reference to every other; and if
possible, every clause and provision shall avail, and have the effect
. Law clerk to the Hon. Consuelo M. Callhan, U.S. Ninth Circuit Court
of
Appeals; J.D. 2005, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1995, The Catholic
University of America. The author wishes to thank Hilary Ayers, Adam

Livingston, Kevin Randlet, Sara Sulkowski, and especially Prof. David Currie
for their helpful discussion and suggestions.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.5.
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contemplated by the legislature. One portion of a statute should not
be construed to annul or destroy what has been clearly granted by
another.2
More recently, the Court has noted that "where two statutes
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
each as effective."3 This rule of interpretation applies no less to
constitutions than to ordinary statutes. Where two constitutional
provisions can be read harmoniously, they ought to be, unless
there is a clear contradiction or clear intent to abrogate an earlier
provision.
Nevertheless, there are times when there is an unavoidable
conflict between two provisions and one must take precedence over
the other. Before discussing the Fifth Amendment and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, it will be helpful to lay out the four
different ways two provisions can be in conflict when an earlier
provision can be regarded as abrogated by a later one.
The first is by an explicit repeal, for example, "The eighteenth
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
hereby repealed."'
Second is by explicit limitation, for example, an amendment
stating: "The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal
cases is hereby limited to felonies." That would not repeal the
sixth amendment but would limit it. This example is necessarily
fictitious in the constitutional context because the United States
Constitution has no such amendments, but this type of liinitation
is quite common in court decisions where a prior decision is not
overruled but is "limited to the facts" of the prior case.' A var-

2. Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 623 (1849).
3. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984); see also Watt
v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (holding that evidence of intention to
repeal an earlier statute must be 'clear and manifest"); United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ("When there are two acts upon the same
subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible."); Cathedral Candle Co. v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that
"[tihe Supreme Court has frequently explained that repeals by implication are
not favored").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
5. It should also be mentioned that courts often find implicit limitations in
the language of provisions that are worded more broadly. For example, Article
III's provision that "trial of all crimes.., shall be held in the state where the
said crimes shall have been committed" looks absolute, but it has been
interpreted as merely a right of the accused. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
This exception began as a requirement of due process under the theory that
obtaining a fair trial might sometimes require change of venue. See Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). If this were the theory, then it would be an
excellent example of what this paper examines: the overruling of one
constitutional provision by the requirements of "due process." Yet Rule 21 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits transfer "[ulpon the
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iation on explicit limitation is a clarifying amendment. For
example, the Eleventh Amendment says "[t]he judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit"
against states by citizens of other states. The amendment does
not alter Article III, but it requires that Article III be construed
more narrowly than its wording might otherwise suggest.
The third and most common way that a constitutional
provision is overturned is by necessary implication because two
provisions are logically contradictory. For example, the
Seventeenth Amendment, providing for direct election of senators,
necessarily contradicts the Article I provision providing for
appointment of senators, even though the amendment makes no
explicit reference to Article I. It is logically impossible for both
provisions to exist at the same time.
The fourth way a constitutional provision can be overturned
is by practical incompatibility. This occurs when, although the
language of both provisions would permit each to exist without
contradiction, one would limit the other so much that for all
practical purposes they are regarded as incompatible. Another
way to look at this is that the basic principles underlying two
provisions are incompatible.
This method of overruling an
amendment by implication is somewhat controversial, but has
been used by the Supreme Court on occasion. The example which
will be fleshed out in more detail below is the Supreme Court's
decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,' which held that the principle of
state sovereignty underlying the Eleventh Amendment was
incompatible with the principle of national supremacy underlying
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first and second categories of overruling provisions are
not particularly important for this paper; we will be focusing on
the third and fourth categories, which are most often employed by
courts to examine the continuing validity of constitutional
provisions. The Natural Born Citizen Clause falls into the third

defendant's motion" for "convenience" as well as when justice requires. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 21.
6. Article III authorizes federal jurisdiction in suits "between a State and
the citizens of another State" - part of what we now call "diversity
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Eleventh Amendment
requires that diversity jurisdiction be construed so that states can sue
individuals, but individuals cannot sue states. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The
amendment also forbids suits against states by non-citizens in "federal
question" cases. Id. The Supreme Court has long held that Article III cannot
reasonably be construed to forbid federal question suits by non-citizen while
permitting them for citizens, so the Eleventh Amendment implicitly forbids
suits by citizens against their own state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890).
7. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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category, and so presents a strong basis for finding the provision
incompatible with the Fifth Amendment.
Let me also make a rather obvious point, but one which is
worthwhile to state explicitly. Every lawyer knows that the
meaning of a statute or provision goes beyond the mere words of
the provision. The meaning of the Fifth Amendment is not wholly
contained in its words, but has been authoritatively explained by
hundreds of Supreme Court opinions. Thus, mention of "the Fifth
Amendment" necessarily means the Fifth Amendment as it is
currently understood by the courts.8
II.

NATIONAL ORIGIN AS INVALID CLASSIFICATION

It is settled law that legal classifications based on national
origin are subject to strict scrutiny and presumptively
unconstitutional. It is worthwhile to briefly review some of this
precedent.
Korematsu v. United States9 is understood to establish the
principle that race and national origin are subject to strict
scrutiny. That case involved an American citizen of Japanese
descent who challenged the exclusion of Japanese from the West
Coast. The majority held, "It should be noted, to begin with, that
all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect .... [Clourts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny."' ° The majority went on to declare that,
"[niothing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities
of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can
constitutionally justify [exclusion of Japanese citizens]. " " The
Court never said what specific provision of the Constitution was at
issue. The majority merely declared that "[clompulsory exclusion
of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under
circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with
our basic governmental institutions." 2
Although the majority did not explicitly say that the Fifth
Amendment was the provision at issue, all three dissenting
opinions cited the Fifth Amendment and seemed to assume it was
the provision whose application was at issue. Justice Murphy
stated the issue most explicitly: "Being an obvious racial

8. I make this obvious point mainly to forestall an objection which might
be raised by non-lawyers that the paper is not about the Fifth Amendment at
all, but only about the Court's current interpretation (or perhaps even
reinterpretation) of the amendment. To that objection I respond that there is,
of course, no legal difference between the Fifth Amendment and courts'

interpretations of the Fifth Amendment.
9. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
10. Id. at 216.
11. Id. at 218.
12. Id. at 219-20.
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discrimination, the order deprives all those within its scope of the
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment." 3
Justice Murphy was ahead of his time in declaring that the
Fifth Amendment guaranteed "equal protection," since it was not
until 1954 that the full Supreme Court embraced this position. In
Bolling v. Sharpe,4 the Court held that racial discrimination in
the District of Columbia was unconstitutional, declaring:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of
Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the
Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the
concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from
our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The
"equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we
do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But,
as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable
as to be violative of due process.15
Thus, the Court went on to "hold that racial segregation in
the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution." 6
The holding in Bolling has been almost
universally applauded. 7
Since Bolling, repeated precedents over the last fifty years
have affirmed that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process
requires equal protection. In 1976, the Supreme Court declared
that "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an
equal protection component prohibiting the United States from
invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups." 8 In
1990, the Court declared:
"The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection binds the Federal
Government as it does the States, and no lower level of scrutiny
applies to the Federal Government's use of race classifications." 9 In

13. Id. at 234-35, (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
245-46, (Jackson, R., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's approval of the
internment program was a dangerous blow to liberty); id. at 232, (Roberts, 0.,
dissenting) (calling the military order a violation of due process).
14. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
15. Id. at 499.
16. Id. at 500.
17. There are some notable originalist exceptions. Distinguished jurist
Michael McConnell has written that "the suggestion that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits segregation of public facilities is
without foundation." Michael W. McConnell (concurringin the judgment), in
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID at 158, 166 (Jack
M. Balkin ed., 2001).
18. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
19. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990).
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Bolling v. Sharpe, the companion case to Brown v. Board of
20
Education, the Court held that equal protection principles
embedded in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibited
the federal government from maintaining racially segregated
schools in the District of Columbia: "[Ilt would be unthinkable that
the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government."2 1 Consistent with this view, the Court has repeatedly
indicated that "the reach of the equal protection guarantee 22of the
Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the Fourteenth."
A few years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena,' the
Supreme Court reiterated that "the equal protection obligations
imposed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments" are
"indistinguishable."'
It is also worth noting that, in the context of the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of equal protection, in Fronteriero v.
Richardson an eight to one majority declared that sex
discrimination in compensation, as practiced by the United States
military,
constituted
"unconstitutional
discrimination.., in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 5
These cases leave no doubt that the Fifth Amendment requires the
federal government, absent a compelling reason or subsequent
modification by later amendments, to avoid discrimination based
on race or national origin.
There is also an explicit statement by the Court that
discrimination between citizens based on whether or not they are
native born is unconstitutional.
Ten years after Bolling, in
Schneider v. Rusk,26 the Court declared unconstitutional a statute
that revoked the citizenship of naturalized citizens who lived
abroad but did not revoke the citizenship of "natural born citizens"
in the exact same circumstances. The Court held that:
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that
naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less
allegiance to this country than do the native born. This is an
assumption that is impossible for us to make. Moreover, while the
Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due

20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Id. at 500.
22. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 604-05 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
23. 515 U.S. 200 (1996).
24. Id. at 217.
25. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1973). See also Rostker v
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that draft registration for men only was
justified by a legitimate state interest, but affirming that Congress was
required by "due process" and "equal protection" (terms the Court used
interchangeably) to avoid sex discrimination without a good reason).
26. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
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process. A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely
without suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at
naturalized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work
abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second27
class citizenship.
This should be the end of the story. Schneider is clear that
treating natural born citizens and naturalized citizens differently
is contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
Forbidding naturalized
citizens from being president or vice president is a form of
discrimination that limits their options and treats them as secondclass citizens.
A.

State Interest

Since national origin is a suspect class, it is not absolutely
unconstitutional to treat natural born and naturalized citizens
differently in every case, but the different treatment must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. It is hard to
imagine any legitimate governmental interest in the Natural Born
Citizen Clause, much less a compelling one. I will not belabor this
point here - the pointlessness of the provision has been amply
and ably attacked from across the political spectrum. 8 It has been
called the worst provision anywhere found in the Constitution."
As one recent article notes:
The natural born citizenship requirement no longer serves any
purpose in the American constitutional system. Any historically
legitimate justification for the proviso faded away long
ago ....[T~he Framers
almost certainly incorporated the
requirement into Article II in an effort to prevent a British
nobleman or foreign prince from infiltrating the vulnerable infant
government.3 °
The idea of a foreign prince being elected president seemed silly
enough even in the eighteenth century. It is hard to imagine any
serious reason for keeping the provision.
It is worth considering whether the fact that the exception is
27. Id. at 168-69 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
28. See Akhil Reed Amar, Natural Born Killjoy: Why the Constitution Won't
Let Immigrants Run for President,and Why that Should Change, LEGAL AFF.,
Apr. 2004, at 16 (calling the provision "un-American"); see also Maximizing
Voter Choice: Opening the Presidency to NaturalizedAmericans: Hearingon S.
2319 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004). (remarks of
Senator Orin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, calling the
provision "artificial, outdated, unnecessary and [an] unfair barrier").
29. See Robert Post, What Is the Constitution'sWorst Provision?,12 CONST.
COMMENT. 191 (1995).
30. Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, 'Naturalborn' in the USA:
The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution's
PresidentialQualificationsClause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV.
53, 134 (2005).
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based upon a provision that was part of the original constitution
might constitute a "compelling state interest." That is to say, one
could argue that because the original Constitution required such
discrimination, continued discrimination is a compelling state
interest, and narrowly tailored in the sense that what is required
is no more and no less than would have been required without a
Fifth Amendment. That type of reasoning however, has been
repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court in equal protection and
due process cases. The fact that a provision is part of a state's
constitution and is of long duration has never been considered by
the Court to entitle such a provision to any deference. In Reynolds
v. Sims3 the Supreme Court struck down a representation plan of
two senators per county, which had been explicitly required by the
state's constitution for more than six decades, and similar
provisions had been part of the state's constitution since the day it
entered the Union. Nor did the fact that a virtually identical
provision was found in the U.S. Constitution entitle the provision
to any deference. 2 Naturally, if the fact that a provision is found
in the Constitution does not constitute a compelling reason on the
state level, it should not constitute a compelling reason on the
federal level either.
There is no doubt that a federal statute which limited
employment to "natural born citizens" would be found
unconstitutional today; or more specifically, it would be found to
violate the Fifth Amendment. If a statute restricting employment
to natural born citizens would be found unconstitutional, the only
question left is to consider whether a provision of the Constitution
should be treated differently than a statute. There is no reason to
think so. In fact, it is almost too obvious to mention that if there is
a conflict between an amendment to the Constitution and the
earlier unamended version, that the amendment must take
precedence. For example, the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment prohibits Congress from spending money in some
ways which would have been permissible in the absence of a First
Amendment.'
If the Fifth Amendment prohibits discrimination
based on national origin then it must supercede any conflicting
provisions in Article II.
31. 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
32. It is also worth noting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), in which
the Court struck down a Colorado Constitutional Amendment that
discriminated against homosexuals.
The fact that the provision was
constitutional rather than statutory entitled it to no deference whatsoever; if
anything, the Court seemed to suggest that the justification for judicial review
is stronger when constitutional provisions are being evaluated since they are
more difficult to revise by the democratic process. Id. at 651.
33. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 (1968) (holding that the
establishment clause is a specific limitation upon the spending power
conferred by Article I).
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The Supreme Court has apparently never held a provision of
the original constitution to be invalid because it conflicted with the
Fifth Amendment, but in the famous case of Battaglia v. General
Motors," the second circuit suggested a similar doctrine. Battaglia
involved a challenge to section 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act
which provided that "[n]o court of the United States... shall have
jurisdiction of any action or proceeding ... for or on account of the
failure of the employer to pay minimum wages."" This provision
denying jurisdiction to federal courts seems well within the
explicit provisions of Article III for Congress to create jurisdiction
for lower federal courts, and the provision that the Supreme Court
could exercise appellate jurisdiction subject to "such exceptions
and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." 6 The
Second Circuit asserted that despite the apparent plenary power
given to Congress by Article III to restrict the jurisdiction of
federal courts, this power was subject to limits imposed by the
Fifth Amendment:
A few of the district court decisions sustaining section 2 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act have done so on the ground that since
jurisdiction of federal courts other than the Supreme Court is
conferred by Congress, it may at the will of congress be taken away
in whole or in part .... We think, however, that the exercise by
Congress of the control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance
with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to
say, while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold and
restrict the jurisdiction of courts other then the Supreme Court it
must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law or to take private
property without just compensation.
This statement was arguably dicta because the court held that the
plaintiffs had not been deprived of liberty or property; hence, the
court did not carry out its threat to exercise jurisdiction revoked by
Congress.
The principle that the Fifth Amendment limits

34. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
35. Id. at 262.
36. See

RONALD

D.

ROTUNDA

&

JOHN

E.

NOwAK,

TREATISE

ON

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 2.11 (2d ed. 1992) ("Since

the beginning, Congress has never given the lower federal courts full Article
III jurisdiction. And the Supreme Court has generally not rejected the
Congressional position. Indeed, the Court has typically spoken broadly in
dictum of Congress' power to grant or take away jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts.").
37. Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 257. Note also that in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
512 U.S. 415 (1994), the Supreme Court found an Oregon law restricting
judicial review of damage awards in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Presumably, an identical federal statute would
violate due process under the Fifth Amendment.
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Congressional power to limit jurisdiction of the courts has received
widespread approval in the legal community.'
Another argument that might be advanced against courts
refusing to nullify a constitutional provision, which they would not
hesitate to nullify if it were a mere statute, would be the
application of some sort of sliding scale. A sliding scale might
mean that a court could strike down a statute as unconstitutional
if the statute more likely than not contradicts a constitutional
provision, but only strike down a constitutional provision if there
is overwhelming evidence that the two are in conflict. 9 There is
something to be said for such a system; after all, if statutes are
found to be deficient, they are fairly easy to redraft and readopt.
Constitutional amendments are very difficult to pass.
This
suggests that the Court should use great restraint in overruling
prior constitutional provisions. This also distinguishes federal
constitutional provisions from state ones, since it is generally
much easier to pass constitutional amendments at the state level.
While the "sliding scale" may seem tempting, ultimately it is
probably
untenable.
First,
the
distinction
between
a
preponderance of the evidence and overwhelming evidence will
often make little sense in terms of legal interpretation. Two
propositions are either logically incompatible or they are not.
More importantly, in theory we already seem to have an
"overwhelming" standard. It was noted above that the Supreme
Court has said that evidence of intention to repeal earlier statutes
must be "clear and manifest."' ° What would the sliding scale look
like: "absolutely clear and manifest?" Perhaps the sliding scale
would require that only the first three methods for finding a
contradiction outlined above would be permitted in the context of
constitutional provisions rather than statutes. Again, there might
be some appeal to such a system, but such a system has not been
used by the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court has not
ruled on the precise issue of when the Fifth Amendment may
38. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 619 (2005). See also ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHER R. MILLER, 20 FED. PRAc. & PRoc. DESKBOOK § 11 (explaining that

"[there is so much authority for the proposition that Congress is free to grant
or withhold the judicial power that it might seem unnecessary to belabor the

point," but going on to note that, "[ilf there is any limit on Congress, [the Fifth
Amendment] is probably the maximum limit.")

39. It would be tempting to defend this sliding scale approach by arguing
that when the Supreme Court declares an act of Congress to be null and void
the Court is only placing itself above Congress, but in striking down a
provision in the United States Constitution it is placing itself above the entire
country. Yet, as Justice John Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison, the
power of judicial review does not mean that the Court is superior to Congress,

it means that the Constitution is superior to both. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Indeed,
until they determine to change it through appropriate means, the Constitution
is, in a way, superior to the entire American people.
40. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
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override earlier constitutional provisions, it has found a later
amendment to have overruled an earlier provision by implication.
The next section analyzes how the Supreme Court found the
Eleventh Amendment to be overruled by implication.
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment presents a particularly interesting
case to examine in the current context because it first changed, or
clarified, the meaning of Article III, and then, in 1976, was itself
found by the Supreme Court to have been limited or modified by
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states
that "[tihe judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the united States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."'
This
Amendment was adopted after the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia,' which permitted a citizen of one state to sue
another state under the Article III provision that the judicial
power of the United States extends to suits "between a state, or
the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects."' The
Eleventh Amendment required that the Article III clause
providing for suits between states and citizens of other states
should not be construed to permit suits against unconsenting
states." This is important because no one has ever imagined that
if there is a conflict between Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment that Article III should be enforced. If there is a
conflict between the two provisions, the later one must take
precedence.
The story of the Eleventh Amendment becomes even more
interesting when viewed in light of the Fourteenth Amendment.4"
In 1976, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment superceded the Eleventh Amendment and
permitted suits against states which violated civil rights.4 It is

41.
42.
43.
44.
about

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2 U.S. 419 (1793).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The amendment says nothing
states consenting to suits, but it does say that "the judicial power of the

United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit" of such a nature,
and jurisdiction cannot be created by consent. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
45. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment at issue are that "[n]o
State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The case involved a suit for damages against the
state of Connecticut for employment discrimination. Id. at 450. The decision
was unanimous, but two justices wrote concurring opinions questioning the
majority's Fourteenth Amendment reasoning and suggesting alternative bases
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almost certainly the case that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not understand themselves to be contradicting the
Eleventh Amendment when the Fourteenth Amendment was
written and ratified. To cite just one example, Representative
Bingham, Chair of the Reconstruction Committee, told the House
of Representatives, "Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that
this amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained
to it."4 7 The Fitzpatrick decision certainly made no attempt to cite
any statement from the reconstruction era debates, appealing
instead to "general intent" by noting that the reconstruction
amendments were "intended to be ...limitations of the power of
the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."4
While private suits against states are one way to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment (although not a way that
was ever mentioned in any of the debates on the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment), there are other ways to enforce the
Amendment.
Other methods include: appeal of state cases
refusing to enforce Fourteenth Amendment provisions to the U.S.
Supreme Court; the United States filing civil suits against state
governments that violated the Amendment; and, the United States
filing criminal charges for violation of civil rights against
individual state officials. All three of these methods have been
used to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and none of them
would explicitly violate the terms of the Eleventh Amendment,
which only bars suits by "citizens" against states.
It should also be noted that for more than a century, the
Supreme Court regarded the Eleventh Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment as fully compatible. In 1908, for example,
the Supreme Court declared:
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits the commencement or
prosecution of any suit against one of the United States by citizens
of another State or citizens or subjects of any foreign State. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall it deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. The case before the Circuit Court proceeded
upon the theory that the orders and acts heretofore mentioned
would, if enforced, violate rights of the complainants protected by
the latter amendment. We think that whatever the rights of
complainants may be, they are largely founded upon that
Amendment, but a decision of this case does not require an
examination or decision of the question whether its adoption in any
way altered or limited the effect of the earlier Amendment. We may

for permitting such suits against states. Id. at 458.
47. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
48. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345 (1880)).

2006]

Limiting the Presidency to NaturalBorn Citizens

1355

assume that each exists in full force, and that we must give to the
Eleventh Amendment all the effect it naturally would have, without
cutting it down or rendering its meaning any more narrow than the
language, fairly interpreted, would warrant.49
As late as 1974, the Supreme Court refused to permit a suit
against a state accused of violating the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment based on the way the state processed
claims for aid by disabled people. In Edelman v. Jordan" the
Court acknowledged that "the equal protection claim cannot be
said to be 'wholly insubstantial,' ' . but refused to reach the merits
of the equal-protection claim, holding that suits for money
damages
against
states were barred
by the Eleventh
Amendment." Edelman was decided by a five to four vote, and
despite there being four strong dissents, the apparently stark
reversal just two years later holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment permitted suits against states seems hard to
reconcile with Edelman.'
Despite the facts that there was precedent to the contrary,
there was no historical evidence that the framers intended to limit
the Eleventh Amendment, and there was no logical contradiction
between the two amendments, the Supreme Court in 1976
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment partially repealed the
Eleventh Amendment.
The Court began by noting previous
decisions recognizing the reconstruction amendments for what
they are, "limitations of the power of the States and enlargements
of the power of Congress." ' From this observation the Court went
on to declare:
It is true that none of these previous cases presented the question of
the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the
enforcement power granted to Congress under §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, see Hans v.
49. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-50 (1908).
50. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
51. Id. at 653 n.1.
52. Id. The Court went on to hold that "a federal court's remedial power,
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief... and may not include a retroactive award which requires
the payment of funds from the state treasury." Id. at 677. Although the Court
did not explicitly say that suits under the Fourteenth Amendment were
always prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court's refusal to even
consider the merits of the equal protection claim is impossible to explain
unless the Eleventh Amendment precluded such suits.
53. Ostensibly, Edelman was distinguished from Fitzpatrick because the
statute in Edelman had not manifested congressional intent to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity. This is one reason Fitzpatrick held that
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment was not automatic but required
Congressional authorization.
54. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454.
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Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that
section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by
appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on
state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to §5, not only is it
exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of
the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their
own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that
Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for
the purpose of enforcing the -provisions- of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
55
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
This language does not leave any doubt as to what the Court was
saying. Suits which are "constitutionally impermissible" are those
forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment, but individuals may
nevertheless bring suits against a state for civil rights violations if
Congress provides for such suits. It is significant that Congress
has the option of permitting such suits. The Court might have
declared, as it did in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents,' that the Constitution directly gives a right of action and
no congressional authorization is needed. This limitation may
simply have been necessitated by prior precedents, such as
Edelman, which the Court preferred to distinguish rather than
overrule directly.
Some of the language used in the Fitzpatrick opinion is
admittedly confusing.
For example, the Court in Fitzpatrick
stated, "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies. . . are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""7
The assertion that the enforcement provisions "necessarily" limit
state sovereignty seems odd in light of the fact that Congress is
not required to take any action.
Other decisions have also
reaffirmed that the exercise of this power by Congress is optional.
For example, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,' the Court
declared: "[Wie hold consistent with Quern, Edelman, and
Pennhurst II that Congress must express its intention to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in
the statute itself. In light of this principle, we must determine
whether Congress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen

55. Id. at 456.
56. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
implicitly permitted suits against the federal government for violations of the
Fourth Amendment rights even if Congress has not authorized such suits).
57. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (emphasis added).
58. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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to override the Eleventh Amendment."59 Congress may choose to
override Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, but need not do so.
Because the
Fourteenth Amendment permits, but does not require, suits
against states, there can be no inherent contradiction on a
substantive level. That is to say, Eleventh Amendment immunity
does not contradict the substantive provisions (the first four
subsections) of the Fourteenth Amendment. It only comes into
conflict with the enforcement clause, which permits Congress to
enact appropriate legislation. Congress could decide to give full
effect to Eleventh Amendment immunity in perfect harmony with
the Fourteenth Amendment - which demonstrates that there is
no direct or substantive contradiction between the two
amendments.60
If one reads the Fitzpatrick opinion carefully, the Court never
suggests there is any inherent contradiction. The incongruity only
appears at a fairly abstract level. The Court declared that the
Eleventh Amendment embodies "the principle of state sovereignty"
while the "provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment ... embody
significant limitations on state authority."6' The explicit provisions
of the two amendments do not contradict each other, but the
principles they embody are contradictory. This is why the conflict
between the Eleventh Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment should be regarded as what has been described above
as the fourth type of conflict.62 A conflict where there is a practical
incompatibility rather than a logical incompatibility.
The Fitzpatrickholding that Congress may abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity in order to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment has had its share of critics.' This article aims neither

59. Id. at 244.
60. Just to clarify what I mean by direct and substantive, as opposed to
procedural, a different example will be helpful. Article IV, Section 2 openly
permitted slavery in the United States by providing that escaped slaves would
be returned to the owners. That was changed by the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibiting slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment constituted a substantive
change in the law of slavery. One can imagine a Thirteenth Amendment
which was strictly procedural, providing that escaped slaves need not be
returned to the owners. As to direct versus indirect, one can imagine a
Thirteenth Amendment which instead of prohibiting slavery, simply said
"Congress shall have power to outlaw slavery." The latter would represent
only an indirect conflict with the escaped slave clause because Congress could
choose not to prohibit slavery and the escaped slave clause would remain
valid. The two provisions would not be incompatible or contradictory in the
ordinary senses of the words.
61. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
62. See supra p. 5.
63. As David Currie has written: "This reasoning is less than
overwhelming. One might have thought that § 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment], like other 'plenary' grants of power, was subject to explicit and
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to defend nor attack this reasoning, but merely to point out that it
appears, at this point, to be settled law. In Hibbs v. Nevada,' the
Supreme Court permitted suit against Nevada under the Family
and Medical Leave Act holding again that Congress could
"abrogate" states' Eleventh Amendment immunity any time it
passed legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. When
we consider how the Supreme Court determined that the Eleventh
Amendment had been annulled, we see that a similar annulment
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause is easily defensible. This
discussion of the Eleventh Amendment is merely meant to point
out that repeal of one constitutional provision by a later one need
not be explicit.
Finally, I want to briefly address the Supreme Court's most
recent foray into the Eleventh Amendment, Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz,' to show that while it was a departure
from past precedent in this area, the case does nothing to
undermine any of the above analysis. At first glance, the Katz
decision suggests that there is a conflict between the Eleventh
Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause,' but the Bankruptcy
Clause took precedence. Actually, Katz simply held that there was
no conflict at all between the Eleventh Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause.67
Katz involved a suit by a bankruptcy trustee in Kentucky
against three state universities to get the universities to refund
money payed them by the bankrupt corporation. This looks like
the sort of suit the Eleventh Amendment explicitly prohibits: it is
a suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia by a citizen of
Kentucky.'
Several prior decisions had declared that the

implicit constitutional limitations; one would hardly read it to empower
Congress to authorize cruel and unusual punishment [for violators of the
Fourteenth Amendment]." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, 573-74 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990). Also, one might argue that one clause of
the Constitution should be read to be repealed only when there is an explicit
repeal. Since "Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in unmistakable language," one might have thought that the
Court should apply the same standard to constitutional interpretation and
require that the framers of the amendment express their "intention to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language." Scanlon, 473
U.S. at 234.
64. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
65. 126 S.Ct. 990 (2006).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
67. 126 S. Ct. at 1004.
68. There is no question that suits against a state university are suits
against states. See, e.g., Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that sovereign immunity precluded suit in federal
court against the University of Alabama under the Americans with Disability

Act).
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Eleventh Amendment had precluded suits against states under all
the provisions of Article I, but that the Fourteenth Amendment
was different because it had been enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment.'
Nevertheless, the majority in Katz declared that
those statements about the Eleventh Amendment overriding
Article I were dicta7' and offered an entirely new justification for
overruling Eleventh Amendment immunity based on the Court's
reading of the original intent of the Bankruptcy Clause:
The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it was inserted in
the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted
under its auspices immediately following ratification of the
Constitution demonstrate that it was intended not just as a grant of
legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited
subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy
71
arena.
The Katz opinion devotes page after page to discussing the
original intent of the bankruptcy provision and finds that "[tihe
ineluctable conclusion, then, is that States agreed in the plan of
the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they
might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to 'Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies." 72 The opinion went on to declare that
"the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, the source of Congress'
authority to effect this intrusion upon state sovereignty, simply
did not contravene the norms this Court has understood the
Eleventh Amendment to exemplify."73 The Court pointed out that
bankruptcy proceedings, like those in Katz, were similar to in rem
proceedings. Virginia was just being asked to cough up the thing
(money) which had been given to it by the bankrupt corporation,
although technically suits for money are not in rem. The Court
also noted that this type of proceeding was similar to a habeas
corpus petition, and habeas suits are not considered suits against
states .7

69. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1011 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent points
out, with some force, that a number of prior statements are difficult to dismiss
as dicta. Id. at 1007. In FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999), the Court declared:

"Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act
cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause."
Thus the idea that the Eleventh Amendment limits all of the Article I powers
of Congress appears to be essential to the holding in FloridaPrepaid.
71. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 996.
72. Id. at 1004.
73. Id.at 1003.
74. Id. at 1002.
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The majority's analogies to in rem proceedings and habeas
suits hardly seem ironclad enough to overcome what appears to be
the clear language of the Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State.. . ."'
The four
dissenting justices found the analogies unpersuasive, but Katz
does nothing to suggest that when there is a real conflict between
two provisions, the later amendment should not take priority.
Admittedly, the Court's conclusion that the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings is
suspicious, and is reached without much analysis of the language
or history of the Eleventh Amendment itself. Perhaps what the
Katz opinion was trying to suggest was that, if the framers of the
Constitution had abrogated state immunity in the context of
bankruptcy just six or eight years earlier, it is unlikely that the
Eleventh Amendment would have changed that so quickly;
therefore, the two provisions should be read harmoniously. That
would make sense, although there does not appear to be any hint
of such an argument in the decision. The same argument might be
used against the Fifth Amendment changing the Natural Born
Citizen Clause. After all, the Fifth Amendment was adopted just a
few years after the original Constitution, and many of the same
people were involved in creating both. The argument that the Due
Process Clause prohibits discrimination, however, is not based on
the view that the framers of the Fifth Amendment believed it did,
the conflict is based upon the settled law of the last fifty years.
If original intent is determinative, then the argument
advanced in this paper is unquestionably wrong. There is no
doubt that the framers of the Fifth Amendment saw no
contradiction between the Due Process Clause and the Natural
Born Citizen Clause, not to mention overt racial discrimination
and slavery.
The Katz decision appears to be a comeback for originalism.
Katz begins and ends with original intent analysis: in 1787, the
framers of the Constitution intended to subject states to suit in
bankruptcy, and that is all that matters.
The Court's
determination of what the framers of the Bankruptcy Clause
understood it to mean in 1787 overcomes both the explicit
language of the Eleventh Amendment and a clear line of cases
stating that Article I powers are insufficient to overcome that
Amendment.
Ultimately, however, the use of original intent to limit the
reach of the Eleventh Amendment does nothing to undermine the
Fifth Amendment analysis for a very simple reason: it is

75. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
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unimaginable that the Supreme Court would reverse itself on due
process and hold that the 1789 understanding of the Fifth
Amendment governs federal discrimination cases. It is almost
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would hold that the Natural
Born Citizen Clause "simply did not contravene the norms this
Court has understood the [Fifth] Amendment to exemplify."76
Regardless of what may be said for Katz's reading of prior
Eleventh Amendment cases, this paper shows that the Natural
Born Citizen Clause undoubtedly contravenes settled Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Thus, while Katz is a unique case, it ultimately does nothing
to undermine the analysis of the Natural Born Citizen Clause.
The next section will examine how the Fitzpatrick line of cases
suggests a model for how the Natural Born Citizen Clause may be
overruled.

III. PARALLELS BETWEEN THE FIFTH AND ELEVENTH AMENDMENTS
The line of cases discussing the Eleventh Amendment is
illustrative of the issue at stake with due process and the Natural
Born Citizen Clause because there are a number of similarities.
First, there is no indication that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment meant to contradict or limit the Eleventh
Amendment, just as there is no indication that the framers of the
Fifth Amendment meant to contradict Article II. Unless one
adheres slavishly to "original intent" (and no one on the Court is
willing to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment should not
supercede the Eleventh), the fact that the interpretation of an
amendment has gone well beyond what the framers envisioned is
hardly a serious argument.
Second, just as the Court noted in Fitzpatrick, that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to place "limitations o[n]
the power of the States,"77 it is equally true that the Fifth
Amendment was intended to place limitations on the federal
government, and on the executive in particular. One could argue
that the Bill of Rights is superfluous and did not alter the original
Constitution in any way (as Alexander Hamilton argued in The
Federalist 8478), but no one has seriously accepted that position in

76. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1003.
77. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454.
78. Hamilton declared:
[Bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are
contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution,
but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to
powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable
pretext to claim more than were granted.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). One could use Hamilton's statement to argue that the Bill of Rights
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about two hundred years.
Third, it may well be that there is no logical incompatibility
between discrimination and the words "due process," just as there
is no logical incompatibility between the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments. Congress could decide not to permit suits against
states, and thus show there is no logical incompatibility between
the two provisions. The Due Process Clause could have been
interpreted differently and have been logically consistent, and it
once was probably thought by most people to be consistent with
the Natural Born Citizen Clause. But, just as the understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment has evolved, and after more than a
hundred years held to permit Congress to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment, so has the understanding of due process. The
Natural Born Citizen Clause is absolutely incompatible with the
current understanding of the Due Process Clause.
Directly
discriminating against one class of citizens based on national
origin is substantive, and it directly and unquestionably
contradicts the very essence of the current understanding of "due
process.""
Thus, the argument against the Natural Born Citizen Clause
is considerably stronger than the argument put forth by the Court
in Fitzpatrick. In addition, the natural born citizen question
would be a matter of first impression.8"
As noted above,
Fitzpatrick had to overrule prior precedent. Indeed, many of the
recent cases finding new applications of due process and equal
protection have overruled recent precedent.81 That was also true of
Brown and Bolling, both of which overturned numerous prior
precedents." In contrast, there is no Supreme Court precedent on
the issue of whether the Natural Born Citizen Clause violates due
process, so even the most slavish adherent to stare decisis could

was not intended to modify the original Constitution in any way; however, the
Court has unequivocally rejected the view that the Fifth Amendment should
be interpreted in the way intended by their authors. Indeed, it may be
conceded that the authors of the Fifth Amendment did not intend to modify
Article II.
79. In other words, while Congress could refuse to allow suits against
states, Congress could not refuse to allow due process. The Fourteenth and
Eleventh amendments are indirectly and only potentially in conflict, while the
Natural Born Citizen Clause and the Due Process Clause are directly and

necessarily in conflict.
80. Robert Post has noted that the proviso has received remarkably little
"judicial gloss." Post, supra note 29, at 192.
81. To cite just a couple recent examples: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)), and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361

(1989)).
82. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Cumming v. Board of Ed.
of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78
(1927); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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embrace the view that the Fifth Amendment negates the Natural
Born Citizen Clause.&
The only precedent which might provide any support for the
idea that discrimination against naturalized citizens might be
constitutional is Rogers v. Bellei.
Rogers held that Congress
could condition citizenship for children born to citizens living
abroad upon residence in the United States. The "condition"
however, is of a strange form. The Court noted that citizenship is
only constitutionally guaranteed to those born in the United
States or those accepted as naturalized citizens.
Congress
permitted children born to citizens living abroad to claim U.S.
citizenship, but was under no constitutional requirement to do so.
In other words, children born abroad whose parents are citizens
have no constitutional right to citizenship. The statute at issue
said that the child born abroad was a U.S. citizen, but that
citizenship would be lost if he or she did not physically reside in
the United States for five years before age twenty-eight. Using
Schneider, the plaintiff argued that this constituted illegal
discrimination among citizens.
The Rogers Court was careful to distinguish Schneider. The
Court called the requirement of residency a "condition subsequent"
of citizenship.' Because it was a condition of citizenship, the
statute was not revoking citizenship. The statute permitted the
children of citizens to exercise the rights of citizenship, but they
were not actual citizens until they had fulfilled the condition of
residing in the United States for five years prior to their twentyeighth birthday. The Constitution did require equal treatment of
citizens born and citizens naturalized. Once these people had
lived in the United States for five years and fulfilled the condition
to become citizens, they had exactly the same rights as all other
citizens (other than, perhaps, being eligible to be president). In
this sense, Rogers reaffirmed the need for citizens by birth and
citizens by naturalization to be treated equally under the Fifth
Amendment, just as Schneider had held. It was only those who
were not yet full citizens (either by birth or naturalization) who
could be treated differently.
Another case that might challenge the theory advocated here
is Matthews v. Diaz.' A unanimous Supreme Court in Matthews
83. The Supreme Court has mentioned in passing that the natural born
citizenship proviso precludes naturalized citizens from being president, but it
has never ruled on the issue in relation to the Due Process Clause, nor as far
as I can tell has this clause ever been material to the holding of any Supreme
Court decision. See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964); Knauer
v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 673 (1944); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
84. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
85. Id. at 834.
86. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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held that when the federal government discriminated against
aliens in favor of citizens, that such discrimination would be
reviewed only under the rational basis test, not under strict
scrutiny. This is significant because the Court has held that state
policies discriminating against aliens are subject to strict
scrutiny.87 The Court reasoned that Article I, Section 8 gave
Congress plenary power to control aliens, and this meant that the
federal government could regulate aliens in ways which would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment if done by the states. If this is
still good law, then it appears to be an exception to Adarand's
pronouncement that "the equal protection obligations imposed by
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments" are "indistinguishable."'
Yet, the Court decided Matthews twenty years
before Adarand, and it seems likely that if this issue arose again
today, Adarand would be read to overrule Matthews. Putting
aside whether Adarand has in fact overruled Matthews, one could
argue that the Court's holding in Matthews was incompatible with
the theory of the Fifth Amendment espoused here. Matthews
seemed to suggest that, had it not been for the grant of power to
the federal government in Article I, Section 8 to set rules for
naturalization, that the federal policy of denying welfare benefits
to aliens would have been a denial of due process. It seems as
though the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 were in
conflict and Article I prevailed.
That reading of Matthews, however, is not correct. Matthews
did not say that the federal government could ignore due process
any time it dealt with aliens. Matthews, and Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, the companion case handed down the same day and
holding that the federal government could not refuse to employ
aliens in the civil service, both held that the Fifth Amendment
placed limits on laws Congress could make with respect to aliens.
Matthews merely held that the due process limits on alienage
legislation passed by Congress required rational basis rather than
strict scrutiny. Matthews in no way contradicts the theory of the
Fifth Amendment put forward here. All of the powers the federal
government exercises under the original articles of the
Constitution are limited by the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. At most, Matthews would suggest
that the Natural Born Citizen Clause should be scrutinized under
rational basis - a test the natural born citizens clause would still
probably fail. Moreover, given that Matthews involved
classifications between citizens and non-citizens rather than
87. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
88. Adarand almost certainly overruled Matthews and Mow Sun Wong.

Mow Sun Wong explicitly noted that "the two protections [afforded by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] are not always coextensive." Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
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classifications among citizens, there is no reason to think that
classifications among citizens would only be scrutinized under
rational basis. This is especially true given precedent to the
contrary discussed above.89
There does not appear to be any other Supreme Court
precedent on this issue, which might call the application of equal
protection into doubt. So stare decisis requires the rejection of
discrimination based on naturalized status, for, as demonstrated
above, the Schneider case and other Fifth Amendment precedent
make the enforcement of the Natural Born Citizen Clause
completely untenable.'
IV.

STANDING AND COURT ENFORCEMENT

There is also a question as to who would have standing to
bring a challenge to the Natural Born Citizen Clause. One could
argue that no one would have standing unless actually elected,
otherwise no harm has been shown. That extreme position is
certainly not compatible with precedent. Since Schneider declared
that treating naturalized citizens as possessing fewer political
rights than natural born citizens stigmatizes them as second-class
citizens and suggests that they may be disloyal, one would think
that any naturalized citizen would have standing to challenge the
provision. In Mow Sun Wong, for example, the plaintiffs did not
need to establish that they definitely would have been hired by the
federal government but for the requirement that all civil servants
must be citizens. The Court granted standing to the five plaintiffs,
merely noting that "each was qualified for an available job," 9' but
they would not even be considered for the job because of their
alienage.'
Surely, a political figure such as Arnold Schwartzenegger,
who is not only "qualified for an available job," but also could have
a legitimate chance to run for president or vice president, would
have standing to bring a challenge since the harm to him is
concrete and more than just speculative.
One argument to consider is whether the Court should get
involved when there is a good chance that the political process will
89. See supra Part II.
90. See supra Part II.
91. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 91.
92. Id. The Court went on to note that the "disadvantage resulting from
the enforcement of the rule ineligibility for employment in a major sector of
the economy is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of

an interest in liberty." Id. at 102. It is true that the two jobs placed off limits
by the Natural Born Citizen Clause are not a "major sector of the economy"
but I do not think this distinction affects the standing issue. Id. If there is an
"available job" for which one is clearly qualified but one is prohibited from
even applying, then whether there is one spot open or a million should not
matter.
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take care of the problem. Indeed, there appears to be a coalescing
majority in favor of amending the Constitution on this point. One
could argue that when political forces are willing to change the
Constitution, the courts should not get involved, and the Supreme
Court should deny certiorari in any case that might arise, or
declare the issue to be a non-justiciable, political controversy.
That argument seems untenable for a couple of reasons. First, if
there is an ongoing violation of the Constitution and a suit is
brought, then a court has a legal duty to rule on it. There is no
precedent for a court refusing to decide if a current law is
constitutional because the legislature seems likely to change it.
The only established basis for such refusal to get involved
(assuming it is a federal question and there are no standing,
mootness or other issues), is the political question doctrine. A full
analysis of the political question doctrine is well beyond the scope
of this paper, but ordinarily a political question is one which either
is constitutionally entrusted to a different branch of government,93
or there is "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the question."9" The Natural Born Citizen
Clause has nothing to do with the powers of the President, and
causes no judicial management problems at all for judicial
management. It is simply a garden variety equal protection issue.
Secondly, arguing that the Court should not get involved
when there is an apparent political solution on the horizon would
actually undermine the authority of the Supreme Court because it
would amount to saying that the only time the Court declares
something to be unconstitutional is when there is no hope of a
constitutional amendment. What would such an implication do to
the Court's often cited assertion to be the arbiter of evolving
standards of decency? If society really were evolving in a certain
way (say evolving towards allowing naturalized citizens to become
President, or that homosexual sodomy should not be a crime), then
the Court would not have to get involved, it could just wait for the
If the Court can wait for an
Constitution to be amended.
amendment to be passed changing the qualifications for President,
why shouldn't the Court wait every time it is asked to declare
some newly evolved standard of decency?
V.

OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE

DUE

PROCESS TO THE ORIGINAL

CONSTITUTION

If the above analysis is correct, and it is true that provisions
of Article II can be set aside by federal judges as contradictory to
the current understanding of the Fifth Amendment, it should be

93. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a
political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers").
94. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 268 (2004).
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noted that there are other provisions of the original Constitution
which may also be subject to challenge.
In Adarand, the majority held that minority set-asides were a
violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth
The majority, however, did not consider the
Amendment.
possibility "that Congress may [pass laws], in determining what is
'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment... which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts."95 If this reasoning is followed,
then Congress can enact affirmative action measures which violate
the Fifth Amendment any time it acts under authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, including measures to combat the
This issue was not
lingering effects of state discrimination.
addressed in Adarand, and Congress, in passing the measure, does
not appear to have appealed explicitly to its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, it appears that this too would be a
matter of first impression before the courts.
There would, of course, be some peculiar limits to this
Under current jurisprudence, the equal protection
doctrine.
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment would still prohibit states
from enacting affirmative action programs, but the enforcement
clause of the amendment would permit the federal government to
do so, in the place of states. So while state universities could not
be compelled by Congress to practice affirmative action, it might
be true that Congress could require private universities such as
Yale and Harvard to use affirmative action programs as a
It might seem odd that the
requirement of federal law.9
Fourteenth Amendment permits, and arguably compels, the
federal government to practice affirmative action while prohibiting
the states from doing so, but there is nothing odd about that at all.
The Commerce Clause,97 for example, gives Congress power to
regulate interstate commerce and at the same time denies that
power to the states. Many other constitutional provisions also
grant an exclusive power to the federal government. To use

95. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
96. The exact way this would work is obviously too complex to work out
here, as well as the exact extent to which private conduct can be limited as
affecting equal protection and said to fall under the aegis of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (permitting
criminal prosecution of private citizens for interfering with the civil rights of
Blacks). Presumably Congress could appropriate money directly into a
minority scholarship fund; they could also presumably require that private
colleges charge less for minority students. Remember, of course, that the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment may be ignored by Congress
when it is acting under the Fourteenth Amendment, just as the Thirteenth
Amendment explicitly exempted slave owners from being entitled to
compensation which otherwise would be required.

97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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another98 example, the Constitution gives Congress power to coin9
money, but it also explicitly forbids states from doing so."
Congress, therefore, could not order states to coin money, but can
do so itself, or could authorize a private bank to do so. Setting
aside recent Court precedent such as Adarand, it would be entirely
logical to read the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid states from
practicing affirmative action while allowing the federal
government to do so.
There are a number of other constitutional provisions that
might be modified through application of the principle of
modification of earlier constitutional provisions by later ones, such
as the provision of Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 stating, "The
Senate of the United of States shall be composed of two Senators
from each state."" In the landmark case Reynolds v. Simms, the
Supreme Court declared:
We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a
substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the State.' 0'
If, as precedents makes clear, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process clause of the
Fifth are coextensive, then the Fifth Amendment prohibits nonproportional representation in the federal legislature as surely as
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits it in the states.
Interestingly, however, the Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in
1913, mentions in passing that "[t]he Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two senators from each State, elected by the
people thereof."''
One could make a strong case that the
Seventeenth Amendment overrules the Fifth, insofar as the Fifth
overruled Article I, Section 3, Clause 1. Nevertheless, there is no
such later amendment applying to the House of Representatives,
so presumably non-proportional representation in the House could
violate due process.

98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
101. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
103. Wyoming, with a population of 495,000 has one representative, while
Nevada, with a population of nearly two million, has two representatives. A
judge could use the Due Process Clause to order redistricting ignoring state
boundaries in order to equalize congressional districts, finding that such a

system "substantially dilutes" an individual's right to vote for representatives.
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There may be dozens of other provisions of the first six
articles of the constitution which could be nullified by federal
judges using the Due Process Clause.
The impeachment
provisions of Article I, Congressional control of the District of
Columbia (and denial of voting rights to residents of the District)
found in Article I, the permission to suspend habeas corpus found
in Article I, and the permission of Congress to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in Article III all probably violate
the current understanding of due process.
Application of the Fifth Amendment in some of these areas
may be more limited than with respect to the Natural Born Citizen
Clause either because of existing precedent or conflict with
multiple provisions of the Constitution. For example, in the area
of restricting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, we can create
some difficult scenarios. Imagine that Congress had not only
stripped the federal courts of all power to hear tort suits, but also
refused to appropriate any money to pay damages. Recall that
Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution declares that "[n]o Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law."' 4
The Supreme Court has
consistently held that Congress must make appropriations for
judgments before plaintiffs against the United States can collect.'
In the current scenario, a plaintiff who has had his property taken
away and destroyed in violation of the Fifth Amendment applies to
a federal district court for relief, but the court has no statutory
jurisdiction nor any money to pay damages. The easy answer to
the question would be that the Fifth Amendment comes later than
Article I, therefore, limitations on the courts' power to order money
judgments do not apply against violations of the Fifth
Amendment.
While one could argue that limitations on appropriations are
themselves limited by the Fifth Amendment, such an
interpretation would be troubling because there are multiple
constitutional provisions which are being modified, as well as a
long line of precedent with respect to appropriations."' In itself, of
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
105. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (holding that "no money
can be taken or drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation by
Congress" and "without such an appropriation it cannot and should not be
paid by the Treasury, whether the claim is by a verdict or judgment"); Glidden

Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962) (holding that the Constitution "vests
exclusive responsibility for appropriations in Congress, and the Court early
held that no execution [for judgment] may issue directed to the Secretary of
the Treasury until such an appropriation has been made").
106. Of course, there were also a long line of precedents upholding the
separate but equal doctrine when the Court reversed course in Bolling and
Brown. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Cumming v. Bd. of Ed.
of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78
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course, the fact that there are multiple constitutional provisions
being abrogated or changed does not necessarily mean the
interpretation is wrong.
The Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, has abrogated or changed literally dozens of clauses of
the Constitution. The doctrine of selective incorporation has
altered the meaning of many original constitutional provisions.
For example, the First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law with respect to the establishment of religion." 1° ' Prior
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal statute
which declared "[n]o State shall establish any religion" would have
violated the First Amendment. Since 1947, such a statute is
perfectly acceptable under the Fourteenth Amendment."° While
courts should certainly use caution in creating new interpretations
of statutes which change or nullify multiple constitutional
provisions, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been held to modify dozens of constitutional restrictions on the
federal government, and there is no reason to think the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be limited simply
because it too would modify a wide range of provisions.
It may be objected that this doctrine will permit the federal
courts to substantially rewrite the basic structure of the federal
government. That is an exaggeration. It would be more accurate
to say that the Fifth Amendment gives federal judges the same
power to recreate and rewrite federal governmental structures as
the Fourteenth Amendment gives them vis-a-vis the states. In
Bolling, the Supreme Court declared: "In view of our decision that
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government."'"
Simply substitute "equal representation" or
"discrimination based on national origin" for "racially segregated
schools," and one has the exact same argument.
If a state
attempted to restrict office-holders to natural born citizens, there
is no doubt it would be found unconstitutional. It is "unthinkable"
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government.

(1927); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
108. In Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme
Court held for the first time that the Establishment Clause was incorporated
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
109. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.

